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ABSTRACT
Digital Forensics is one of the latest challenges for the use of forensics in the investigative process
in the United States. Some of the challenges are created by conditions and circumstances present
for law enforcement around the world. However, many are unique to the United States and created
by the standards of evidence within our courts, nature of our law enforcement organizations, and
structure of our judicial and prosecutorial systems. It is essential for the preservation of public
security and individual safety that competent systems of digital forensics are developed for law
enforcement at all levels. The failure to do so will let the guilty avoid responsibility for their criminal
actions while possibly subjecting the innocent to unprecedented government intrusion into their
private lives.
Keywords: digital forensics, law enforcement, public security, technology, cyber security

1. INTRODUCTION
Digital Forensics is: " ... use of scientifically
derived and proven methods towards the
preservation,
collection,
validation,
identification, analysis, interpretation of digital
evidence derived from digital sources for the
purpose of facilitation or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal or
helping to anticipate the unauthorized actions
shown to be disruptive to planned operations"

@ 2017 ADFSL

(Palmer, 2001).
Digital forensics arose in
response to the digital age and with all of the
advances and positive contributions to our
ability to communicate, work and play more
effectively and efficiency. Simultaneously, the
abuses and misuses of digital forensics also
arose. At no other time in history has society
been so dependent on technology and its various
offshoots and incarnations (United Nations,
1999).
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Technology has changed the way in which
we interact as a society (NRC , 2002; Rogers,
2003). The US Census Bureau estimated that
in the year 2001, e-business retail sales totaled
$34 billion (US Bureau of Census, 2002).
Estimates of e-business retail sales for 2015
totaled $340.4 billion (US Bureau of Census,
2017).
This represents an increase of 900
percent over this fourteen-year period.
Similarly, individuals are increasingly using the
internet. The US Census reported that in 2012,
74.8 percent of total US households reported
that someone in the household had access to the
Internet from some location. For individuals 44
years and younger, the rate of access was over
80 percent (US census, 2014).
Similarly, in 2000, 53 percent of US
residents reported that someone m the
household accessed the Internet from some
location. In 2012, this rate of reported use had
increased to 75 percent (US Census, 2014). Of
those accessing the internet in 2012 , 69 percent
reported access from home and 75 percent from
hone or some other location. In 2015,
approximately 95 percent of US respondents
reported owning a cell phone with 77 percent
reporting owning a Smartphone. This is up
from 83 percent cell phone and 35 percent
smartphone ownership m
2012
(PEW
Foundation, 2017).
With the advent of increased technology
and increased use of technology comes misuse.
Not all misuses of electronic devices are crimes.
Cybercrime takes various forms but is generally
defined as "crimes committed through the use of
digital devices as either the object of a crime,
the instrument to commit a crime, or a
repository of evidence related to a crime"
(Agarwal, et. al., 2011).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In 2011 a survey of 50 large US companies found
that the median cost related to cybercrime in
2011 was $5.9 million. This represents a 56
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percent increase over the median cost reported
in 2010 (Cybercrime Research Center, 2011).
The forms of cybercrime reported were mixed
but more insidious such as malicious code,
denial of service and Web-based attacks. It took
an average of 18 days and $417,748 to clean up
the attacks an increase from the 14 days and
$247,744 reported in 2010. The average number
of successful attacks reported was 72 per week,
up 44 percent from the previous year
(Cybercrime Research Center, 2011).
Similarly, individuals report various types of
Cybercrime on an increasing frequent annual
basis. In 2000, there were 16,838 complaints of
internet crime to the Internet Crime Complaint
Center. By 2011, the number of complaints had
increased to 314,246 totaling an estimated
$485 .3 million in losses. The most frequently
reported crimes were: advanced fee scams (9%),
identity theft (9%), FBI-related scams ( 11 % )
and (7%) non-auction or non-delivery of
merchandise (Internet Crime Complaint Center,
2011). In 2016 , the number of complaints filed
was 298,728 with a reported $1.33 billion in
victim losses (Internet Crime Complaint Center,
2016). The US Federal Trade Commission
reported that in 2009, 26 percent of all
complaints involved some form of computerrelated crimes. The specific crimes in included:
credit card fraud ( 17%), theft of government
benefits or documents (16%), and theft of phone
or utilities (15%) (Federal Trade Commission,
2010).
Also, apparent within these trends is the
increased use of the cell phone as a repository of
criminal evidence. Cell phones are now a major
crime scene item that is captured and analyzed
in the course of the investigation of the full
range of crimes. Law enforcement agencies are
also increasingly relying on cell phone-related
evidence. In a survey conducted in 2007, law
enforcement commanders reported the belief
that cell phone evidence was frequently involved
in both violent crimes and drug offenses.
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Approximately 40% of the commanders believed
cell phone evidence was involved in 51 % or more
of all violent crimes and approximately 50%
that cell phone evidence was involved in 51 % or
more of all drug offenses (Losavio, et. al., 2007).
Digital forensics units report that more than
70% of their examinations involve cell phones
(Personal Correspondence, FBI Regional
Computer Forensics Lab Program National
Advisory Committee, May 2012).
While digital evidence is becoming more
prevalent, this boom in technology poses
significant challenges for law enforcement. Even
today, computer security and digital forensics is
evolving and will continue to do so because as
technology changes so must efforts for security
and digital forensics. Digital forensics, as a
discipline, has progressed through three stages,
to date (Charters, 2009; Pollitt, 2010). Digital
forensics and computer security were preceded
by the development of computers in 1947 and is
defined as the beginning of the Industrial Era of
Computing (History of Computing Foundation,
2010). The first phase of digital forensics is the
Ad Hoc (Charters, 2009) or Infancy (Pollitt,
2010) stage.
Computers were generally
mainframe computers and the possession of
large organizations. Personal computers were in
use and were powerful but were not user friendly
and had relatively few applications that could
be of general use to individual "hobbyists"
(Pollitt , 2010). This was the "pre-forensics"
stage characterized by a lack of structure, goals
and clear policies and procedures to govern the
identification and collection of digital evidence.
Evidence was collected but the quality
questioned due to unclear policies within
organizations concerning employee "use" of
corporate property and "ownership" of
employee's work products on corporate
computers.
Accuracy of forensic tools and
"chain-of-custody" issues were significant in that
there were few, if any, court decisions
concerning digital evidence during this era. Law

@ 2017 ADFSL

JDFSL V12N3

enforcement agencies were beginning to use
digital evidence, but training was limited,
examiners were often individual investigators
with an "interest" in computers and therefore,
digital forensics "operated in direct conflict with
the traditional, laboratory-based practice of
forensic science" (Pollitt: 8, 2010). The second
phase of digital forensics, Childhood, extended
from 1995 through 2005 (Pollitt, 2010). It is
characterized by tremendous growth not only of
digital forensics applications and policies,
regulations and laws related to the use/ misuse
of computers and other electronic devices but of
individual use/ misuse of electronic devices and,
most notable, the "explosion of child
pornography cases" beginning with the George
Stanley Burdynskim Jr. case in 1993 (Pollitt ,
2010). Additionally, this era encompassed the
events of September 11 , 2001 and the use of
computers by terrorists and a lack of expertise
on the part of law enforcement and the military
to handle these events. The need for specialized
training due to the increased volume of cases,
increasing complexity of technology and
growing knowledge within the field became
increasingly evident. Field came to develop
through impetus from government agencies and
specialize digital forensics organizations.
The next phase, Adolescence, covered 20052010 (Pollitt, 2010). With this phase came
increasing legal specification that defined digital
information as evidence and specified a
mechanism for eDiscovery (Manes, et .al., 2007).
Academic and detailed, advanced training
programs grew as did the complexity and
maturity of devices to be examined. "Virtually
every device that use( d) electricity ha( d) some
form of digital storage.
Wired or wireless
networks connect(ed) many of the devices we
use(d) in our daily lives" (Pollitt: 12, 2010).
Organized processes and procedures for the
identification, collection, analysis, preservation
and presentation of digital evidence were
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developed by law enforcement, the military and
the intelligence community.
The development of digital forensics within
American law enforcement has and continues to
face many challenges. These include: access to
digital services; training and equipment needs
(economic issues); lack of standardization; legal
issues related to the validity and reliability of
digital evidence (forensic science versus
technology); increased complexity of digital
evidence (cloud computing, hard drive
encryption, size of data to be seized/ analyzed)
and related digital issues. However, the overreaching issue is that of cultural lag relative to
technology and the law/ ethics that exists and
continues to drive much of the social behavior
related to the use of technology.

2 .1

Access to Digital Services

The United States has approximately 18000 law
enforcement agencies, each with a unique
geographic and legal jurisdiction. Each funded
differently with no consistent standards for law
enforcement training, equipment, services, or
policies and procedures.
As such, the
availability of digital forensics resources is
extremely uneven among law enforcement
agencies throughout the United States. Some
law enforcement agencies, generally the federal
agencies and largest US police departments have
their own digital forensics units for purposes of
examining, analyzing and preserving digital
evidence. However, large jurisdictions, those
with 1000 or more sworn personnel constitute
only .4% of all local police agencies in the US.
In fact, most police agencies, 95.4% have fewer
than 100 sworn personnel and are responsible
for jurisdictions with fewer than 25000 in
population (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013).
A survey of law enforcement agency digital
forensics resources was conducted in 2005. A
total of 576 law enforcement agencies were
surveyed. A majority of the agencies (72.3
percent) did not have a dedicated digital
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evidence unit and another majority (58.1
percent) had no digital evidence policies. Only
approximately one half had digital forensics
awareness training.
Similarly, most (57.5
percent) reported the collection of digital
evidence in from O to 5 percent of their
investigations (Pollitt, 2005). Another survey
of police commanders reported that 35%
responded they had failed to use digital (cell
phone) evidence in criminal cases due to a lack
of access to expertise to extract and preserve the
digital evidence (Losavio, et.al., 2007).
Clearly, the emphasis on local law
enforcement and lack of consolidation of law
enforcement within the United States has
resulted in "uneven" access to digital evidence
resources. This includes awareness training on
digital evidence (what is digital evidence, why
it should be seized at the crime scene), as well
as access to resources to extract and preserve
digital evidence in criminal cases. While some
of the variation in digital forensics may be the
product of decisions by leadership within these
agencies, it is, in all likelihood, more directly
related to economic factors.
Several projects have sought to remedy this.
For example, the Secret Service provided
training and equipment to departments around
the country willing to dedicate staff to this.
Continued expansion of this capability will be
crucial to public security.

2. 2

Training and Equipment

Nea:Js
"The collection of electronic data as evidence of
crime is an important responsibility given to law
enforcement. The technical constraints of this
task are arguably far less significant than
usability and economic ones, since police officers
are non-specialists and police departments face
significant budgetary limitations" (Moore: 1,
2006).
The primary constraints on digital
evidence practice for law enforcement agencies
are economic rather than technical. Training in
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digital forensics examination techniques is very
expensive, and may cost as much as $10,000 for
basic training in data extraction and upwards of
$20,000 for training in more specialized digital
examination techniques such as extraction of
data from damaged hard drives (Personal
Correspondence, FBI Regional Computer
Forensics Lab Program National Advisory
Committee, May 2012). Additionally, one-time
training is not sufficient because as technology
changes, skills must be enhanced, and so regular
in-service training is required on at least an
annual basis.
In addition to the training, digital forensics
requires complex hardware and software that
may cost tens of thousands of dollars. And,
while the needs for data extraction on some
devices such as personal computers may be
conducted using many available tools due to
standardization of hard drives, storage on
devices such as cell phones and smart phones is
within the phone's internal memory, is absent
standardization and within locations that vary
depending on the model. Even cords used to
transfer information are not standardized. As
such, cell phone examination is much costlier
and requires specialized software and cables that
are ever increasing with the release of new phone
models.
Because of the size of their jurisdiction,
number of sworn personnel, and the frequency
of crime, budgets are limited, and the start-up
and ongoing costs of digital evidence equipment,
software and training may not be cost effective.
However, even with larger law enforcement
agencies, the economics are pressing and bear
fixed costs with some additional marginal costs
associated with the extraction (Moore, 2006).
When access to the digital resources of a large
police agency or central state forensics unit is
available, that access may increase the marginal
costs of the data collection. For example, the
time for a police investigator to drive 60 or 100
miles carrying digital devices for examination to
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a centralized department results in higher
personnel costs, transportation costs and may
make the "chain-of-custody" more complex and
potentially problematic.

2. 3

Lack of Standardization

Lack of standardization within digital forensics
is significant in several ways. 1) There is no
standardization across all law enforcement
agencies
concerning
the
appropriate
"investigative" model. For example, Agarwal,
et. al. (2011) identified and discussed four prior
investigative models as well as their currently
proposed
(Systematic
Digital
Forensic
Investigative) model.
The need for a
standardized procedure within digital forensics
is critical for the nature of the discipline, i.e.,
justification of the discipline as scientific rather
than technical; establishing benchmarks in the
investigation of crimes involving digital
evidence; meeting legal challenges based on the
integrity and admissibility of digital evidence;
and create comparability of investigative
techniques nationally. 2) As noted previously,
access to digital forensics resources is not
standardized
across
law
enforcement
jurisdictions and therefore, the ability to use
digital forensics varies by agency and geographic
location. 3) There are no standards for what
constitutes "appropriate" digital forensics
examination training, no standards for
"appropriate" digital forensics examination
techniques and no standards for "appropriate"
digital forensics tools. "Experts" within the
discipline are, for the most part, self- defined
though those within the FBI CART are
generally recognized as having some of the most
detailed and complete training. Proprietary
sources for the software and hardware generally
determine "adequacy" of their proprietary
training that is "purchased" along with the
hardware and/ or software to be used in the
digital forensics process.
Whether students
"pass or fail" is not an issue and may or may not
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be recorded by any other than the agency
sponsoring (paying for) the training.
The American Society for Crime Lab
Directors has an official board
(Lab
Accreditation Board) that accredits digital
forensics labs.
It is currently the only
accrediting body for crime labs. Similarly, one
non-proprietary group for testing computer
forensics software, National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer
Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) division is a
government entity that performs tests on
software.
Similarly, the FBI's Technology
Division performs tests on digital examination
software and hardware as a means of
determining whether the devices meet the
standards set for these tasks by the organization
itself. These regulatory bodies are not sufficient
to keep pace with changes in computing and
electronic devices.
A survey was administered to digital
forensics examiners in 2003 (Rogers and
Siegfried, 2004). These respondents expressed
concern over an absence of national standards
for digital forensics. Specifically, they were
concerned there were no national certifications
for digital forensics and the linkage between
several current certifications and vendors such
that the vendors certified the customers on
proprietary tools. As noted by the authors,
" ... proprietary certifications only increase the
level of fragmentation within the industry and
perpetuate the misguided belief that there is no
generic conceptual approach to computer
forensics" (Rogers and Siegfried, 2004: 15).

2. 4

Admissibility of Digital
Evidence

Evidence gathered through all forensics
disciplines must meet basic evidentiary and
scientific standards if it is to be used in legal
proceedings. The US Supreme Court set these
standards in the decision in the case of Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993).
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The decision set standards for determining the
scientific basis of evidence because the law views
scientific evidence as more reliable and therefore
more acceptable than non-scientific evidence.
The process under Daubert identifies four
general categories to use in the assessment of
evidentiary procedures: Testing (Can and has
the procedure been tested?), Error rate (Is there
a known error rate of the procedure?),
Publication (Has the procedure been published
and subject to peer review?) , and Acceptance
(Is the procedure generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community?).
Whether or not digital evidence meets the
standards of admissibility under Daubert is and
will continue to be a recurring issue. 1) Testing
- This legal standard asks whether a forensics
tool can and has been tested to prove that it
produces accurate results. Organizations such
as National Institute of Standards and
Technology have performed and published
digital tools but, to date, no standard testing
methodology exists. Most often, problems with
open and closed source applications are
identified by users in the field. The users then
report the problems to the vendors.
The
vendors make the necessary changes but may
not be motivated to report these findings ,
generally, to the public or justice practitioners
(Carrier, 2002). Similarly, 2) Error rate - This
standard asks whether there is a known error
rate for the procedure. Manufacturers of digital
forensic tools do not necessarily want to provide
a "known error rate" for their tools. In fact,
promoting the error rate would simply be "bad
for business." As such, when major errors are
reported by users, the manufacturers simply
make changes to the tools (new and in-service)
without drawing too much attention to the
problems with their "product." 3) Publication Whether the procedure has been published and
subject to peer review. As digital forensics has
matured as a science, so have the number of
research projects and publications on the
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various tools.
Much is, however, still
proprietary
and
protected
with
the
manufacturers conducting internal validation
research on their own products, making the
changes necessary, without publication of the
results. Only with the field user or organization,
such as the FBI that methodically validates all
instruments used in the digital forensics process,
are the tools validated and the results published
and distributed for general consumption. In
some instances, even these validation studies
carried out by the FBI are not published since
identification of a weakness with a digital
forensics tool might call into question
convictions based on the findings from this
instrument and/ or provide offenders with
information to more efficiently perform the
activities involved in cybercrime without
detection. 4) Acceptance - The last standard
assesses whether or not the procedure is one
that is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community. The interpretation of this
standard is varied. On the one hand, the digital
forensics tool vendors argue that numbers of
customers are a measure of "acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community.
However,
customers are "users" and "users" are not
necessarily "scientists" but rather trained
professionals who use the tools developed and
vetted by the scientist.
When number of
customers is not used, scientific publications
become a criterion and, as such, the limitations
discussed in the "Publication" standard would
apply.
Since 2007, the US Federal District Court
has rendered more than 1000 court opinions
concerning cell phones and their use as evidence
or sources of evidence within criminal
proceedings (Law.Justia.Com, downloaded May
15, 2012). Additionally, since 2008, the US
Federal District Courts have rendered more
than 500 opinions concerning digital evidence.
While not all were questions related to the
admissibility of this type of evidence in the
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specific cases, the op1mons addressed various
legal issues related to this newest form of
scientific
evidence
(Law.Justia.Com,
downloaded May 16, 2012).
Judicial determinations are based on
findings of fact that are informed by the not
only the law but the general knowledge of judges
on the specific topic.
The extent to which
judges are familiar with electronic evidence and
systems may affect decisions concerning the
admissibility of digital evidence. A survey of
judges in 2005 found that while the majority
(75%) expected significant changes in the future
and felt they needed significant training (95%)
in digital evidence, only a minority actually had
experience in digital evidence. Only 5 percent
reported handling cases involving email
evidence and 3 percent website or Internet
evidence. However, when used, 17 percent
reported email evidence was frequently or
almost always challenged with 20 percent
reporting similarly for website or Internet
evidence (Losavio, et.al., 2006). If judges do not
understand digital evidence, it may be more
difficult to make a determination concerning its
admissibility and therefore challenges to digital
evidence may be more numerous and affirmed
more frequently.

2. 5

fucreased Complexity of
Digital Evidence

Law enforcement agencies are dealing with
increasingly large amounts of digital evidence.
The agencies have moved from analysis of bytes
to megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes and
petabytes. Personal computers now hold more
information and more processing power than the
corporate mainframe of 15 years ago. Digital
examiners must have the capability to process
large amounts of information and to do it
accurately, completely and in a timely manner.
This requires advanced equipment and therefore
results in additional costs that are not
necessarily part of the budget of most US law
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enforcement
agencies.
Similarly,
law
enforcement agencies will soon be addressing
more issues related to encryption as computer
companies begin to mass produce personal
computers with self-encrypting hardware - more
training, more equipment , more costs. Lastly,
issues such as "cloud computing" raise serious
questions requiring legal clarification. That
which is most specific is "who" owns the
information an individual stores in a proprietary
"cloud" and what reasonable expectations for
privacy can an individual have when operating
in a proprietary "cloud" environment. What can
vendors be required to do in terms of
notification to consumers and public reports on
law enforcement information requests relative to
"cloud" computing? Which entity should be
named in the warrant - the vendor or the
customer? These are complicated issues that
will need to be addressed within a relatively
short amount of time.

2.6

Other Issues

Perhaps the greatest challenge that faces not
only US law enforcement but all law
enforcement involved in digital forensics is
cultural lag. Cultural lag is a term coined by
William Ogburn (1922). It refers to differences
between technology and the "non-material"
components of a culture in which there is a "lag"
between the material (technology) and nonmaterial culture. Since technology changes at a
rapid and ever-increasing rate, the ethical
"guides" for use of technology are in a constant
state of "lag" since social norms and values do
not change at the same rate as that of
technology.
Marshall (1999) raised the issue of cultural
lag and argued it is appropriate and important
to address whether new technologies introduce
ethical problems. The development of social
guidelines and norms for technology becomes
even more significant when technological change
creates great cultural shift due to rapid diffusion
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across a wide range of human activities
(Marshall, 1999; Robinson, 1981). Such is the
case with computing. Normative, legal and
ethical issues surround technology and multiply
as technology changes and becomes more
distributed throughout the everyday lives of
members of our society. Some of the issue are
normative such as etiquette related to cell phone
use or practical considerations related to the
consequences of what individuals choose to post
on Facebook pages. Others are related to ethics
and include issues of Internet postings, using a
roommate's computer without permission or
"sexting" on a PDA.
Many are not only
unethical but also illegal. Many times, however,
the illegal or unethical nature of acts is not
recognized - at least not initially, until
realization is made of the "harm" that occurs or
can occur. Who would have thought that there
would be a need for laws related to the
distribution of pornographic images of children
over the Internet or that a specialized form of
"bullying" that is, cyber bullying would emerge?
The
American society is diverse.
development of values, beliefs, ethics, and laws
does not occur in a controlled focused
environment.
Instead, it occurs through
individuals with widely divergent backgrounds,
knowledge, skills, etc.
Changes in cultural
norms, values and belief systems is not specific
and does not emerge quickly.
Unlike the
development of technology, there is no market
structure to reward changes in the non-material
culture. That is, those who ponder and assist
in the development of ethical standards are not
rewarded monetarily. It is not possible to
develop ethical standards until after-the-fact
that is, until after the development of new
technology.
As such, our understandings,
ethics, beliefs and social guidelines related to
technology use will always "lag" behind the rate
of development of technology itself.
Some of the cultural lag is evident in the
development of law at the highest levels, the US
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Supreme Court. This court has had to, afterthe-fact, develop new standards fore-Discovery,
to determine whether or not cell phone
companies are obligated to provide law
enforcement with cell phone information that
would track the activities of their customer.
Standards
of
privacy
and
reasonable
expectations of privacy have been redefined in
response to electronic technology. In the past,
many of the Supreme Court rulings were based
on the premise that individuals did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when in a
public area/ situation. Most recently, the US
Supreme Court decided that our citizens do
have a reasonable expectation to privacy in
public places when ruling on the legality of
search and seizure in a case in which law
enforcement used GPS to track the movements
of a suspect in a recent case. In the ruling, one
Justice rendered a solo opinion stating that
individuals had more of a right to privacy in
data held by phone and Internet companies
than the Supreme Court had held in the past
(www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/scotus-gps______________
ruling/
_ _ , downloaded May 16, 2012).

3. RElVIEDIATION
POSSIBILITIES
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MPE suites) and training on these systems and
software.
The results demonstrated both the capacity
for greatly expanding digital forensic services
where there was commitment to use them.
Table 1 contains the results for one agency
assigned a full-time staff/ officer to conduct
examinations, produced the following result in
roughly one-year period:
These examinations included a variety of
crimes:
murder, robbery, rape, unlawful
imprisonment, assault, narcotics trafficking,
child pornography and child sexual exploitation.
The
initial
cases
were
child
pornography/ exploitation cases. However, over
the one-year period, use of the services had
expanded to address other kinds of cases,
including homicide, rape and robbery. This
indicates the shift towards use of digital
forensics as an investigative tool across the
criminal justice spectrum. It is worth noting
that as the project evolved, these services were
used by other law enforcement agencies,
including the federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Kentucky
State Police.

There are a variety of possibilities for the
remediation of these obstacles to the
deployment of digital forensics resources. One
project, for example, has tested linking a federal
Bureau of investigation regional computer
forensics laboratory (RFCL) with local law
enforcement mini-laboratories for analysis
directed using a triage model to allocate
resources to cases. Each participating agency
or agency division provided, among other
things, secure laboratory space, a dedicated
employee, employee training, and use of the
digital forensics facilities. The project provided
computer hardware, digital forensics suite of
examination software (AccessData's FTK and
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Table 1.
Number and Type of Examinations
Se ptember
# Cell
#
2011
Computers
phones
- July 2012
(SIMs)
September
6
October
18
5
November
5
December
7
Januarv
2
13
F ebruarv
3
March
2
10
April
9
1
4
Mav
23
June
9
Julv
1
5
totals
14
88

Other
1

12

1
7
3
4
3
2
2
22

Another participating agency, which had
been conducting its own digital forensics
examinations, integrated the new tools and
training into its operations. The data from its
operations showed a significant shift from the
examination of computers and related
peripherals to the examination of cell phones for
evidentiary purposes; approximately one third
of the examinations were for outside agency
seeking assistance with digital forensics
examination. Similarly, another local law
enforcement agency with a pre-existing digital
forensics capacity and school online safety
program also found a strong trend towards
examination of mobile devices over that of
computers.
While the majority of cases
to
be
child
pornography,
continued
examinations were also part of investigations for
drug trafficking, counterfeiting, forgery and a
car bombing.
This project demonstrates that when
provided services along with the willingness to
use them; law enforcement agencies quickly find
that digital forensic services play a role in nearly
all forms of misconduct. Growth in the use of

1

MicroSD cards are counted as separate devices
although they are associated primarily found
associated with cell phones in these examinations
2
TomTom GPS lEX00

Page 56

digital forensic services was also furthered by
expansion of the examination of mobile devices
relating to criminal misconduct.
Another project that promoted the
distribution and use of digital forensics services
were online, activated, distributed software
tools with hardware connector kits and online
training made available to qualifying law
enforcement agencies. The forensic tool
provided for data acquisition, analysis and
reporting relating to cell phone examinations. It
offered keyword searching and transactional
timeline, frequency and linkage visualization for
phone, text and web activity on the device. 4
Analysis of data from one month of system
use showed a broad use by many agencies
municipal, county, federal and state law
enforcement, including the Office of the State
Fire Marshall, Lincoln University Police
Department and the Kansas Department of
Wildlife and Parks -- examining many different
kinds of devices, cell phones predominated:

•
•
•
•

Total successful exam logins - 210
# agencies using system - 40
# different mobile devices - 74
# different manufacturers - 12

Data entry was inconsistent , with about one
quarter noting the crime with which the
associated device was being examined; those
crimes included homicide, aggravated rape,
aggravated assault and narcotics offenses.
The widespread and rapid adoption of this
system again supports the conclusion that where
resources and training are easily available, they
will be adopted quickly by law enforcement as
tools for crime investigation and prosecution.

3

Includes a tablet computer
Secure View 3 Case Management-Analytics:
http: //www.mobileforensics.com/ svProbe (accessed
July 9, 2012)

4
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4 . IIVIPLICATIONS
Computer crimes are highly impersonal, in most
instances . They involve behaviors not generally
addressed through existing moral standards.
There is no need to face the victim when
engaging in the crime. There is no need to
observe the harm created by the illegal
behaviors. Offenders generally only think of the
implications of what they as one individual are
doing and do not think of the implications of
spreading this harm among millions of
individuals and therefore, magnifying the harm.
There exists only limited understanding of the
perpetual nature of cyberspace and consequent
harm.
Computer crimes additionally raise new
challenges for the laws and only as new crimes
emerge from the misuse of new technologies,
laws must be changed and developed to address
previously unknown issues. Technology also
introduces a wide range of new vulnerabilities
criminals can use to take advantage of their
victims.

5. CONCLUSION
The expansion in both the presence of digital
devices in relation to a crime locus as well as the
use of digital devices as tools for the commission
of crimes will continue, particularly as we see
the growth of the Internet of Things and the
present of interconnected devices everywhere.
These provide both opportunities for crime as
well as opportunities for investigation to solve
those in other crimes. It is essential for the
preservation of public security and individual
safety that competent systems of digital
forensics be available for all levels of law
enforcement. The failure to do so will let the
guilty avoid responsibility for their criminal
actions while possibly subjecting the innocent to
unprecedented government intrusion into their
private lives. This is abhorrent to the rule of law
and deserves our full attention.
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